

Narrative as Master: A Forum on Fred Anderson's *Crucible of War*(1)

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Introduction by Ian K. Steele

This accomplished retelling of the Seven Years' War in North America offers hope, and cautions, to those who want professional historians to write careful history that is accessible to a larger audience who enjoy well-told historical narratives. Ideally, a compelling and nuanced story will carry a subtext of analysis and argument that is not too insistent for general readers, and yet will convince fellow-scholars that something valuable has been added to knowledge. All five reviewers here confirm what the popular press and book club adoptions suggest: Anderson has written a masterful narrative.

All academic book reviews will indicate how *The Crucible of War* appears to experts, but there is special merit in assembling reviews by five scholars who have very different contexts, and then inviting the author to respond. John Shy is best known for his classic book on the military and the coming of the American Revolution and for another on military aspects of that conflict.(2) Gregory Dowd has published a pioneering study of Amerindian resistance to Europeans in the lifetime after 1745 and is currently working on what was once called "Pontiac's War."(3) Jay Cassell has completed a book-length manuscript on the armies of New France, and Jonathan Dull has completed one on the French government and the loss of Canada. Peter Marshall is a leading scholar of the eighteenth-century British empire, specializing in British government policy and the empire in India after 1740.(4)

The earlier narrators of analogous versions of the years 1754-66, Francis Parkman, Richard Waddington, and Lawrence H. Gipson each needed five volumes; Anderson has written a single hefty volume, one that was initially intended to encompass an additional thirty years. It is hardly surprising that all five reviewers want more, which is a compliment, and want more on subjects they know well. The comparatively modest additions sought by Shy and Dowd reveal the book's strengths and intended emphases, while Cassell, Dull, and Marshall want more substantial changes.

Another shared reaction is that the narrative over-emphasizes contingencies, coincidences, and individuals. To some extent, this is inherent in narrative, though Anderson is deliberately countering determinism "so that not just historical forces but the actions, motives, and characters of individual actors could be seen to shape outcomes." The rather breathless narratives race through 74 brief chapters, starting and ending in media res, and the story is seldom interrupted by deliberate analysis. Social, economic, geographic and cultural forces enter the story only when the narrative invites subordinate clauses. One strength of Anderson's approach is that there is something very familiar and convincing about the unreflective immediacy and unpredictable contingency that mirrors the private and public worlds we all inhabit. Yet it is also possible that full and careful consideration of specific people and events severely inhibits those larger generalizations that historians defensively insist is the difference between their profession and antiquarianism. On the road to glittering generalization, how many specific people and events can we dismiss as atypical or aberrant?

In disarming concessions to his reviewers, Anderson goes well beyond predictable courtesies. The honest admission that he used only English language sources is rather shocking, though historians of New France have long suspected this limitation in American colonial historians. Anderson's delineation of his as a "provincial" perspective, what John Shy calls a "metroliner" outlook, confirms what other critics contend.

Anderson's remarks on the limitations and demands of the narrative are particularly intriguing and puzzling. He argues that the narrative had a will of its own, overcoming his intentions and arguments, and growing so readily that the beginning and end of the story, and much attending analysis, were all eventually pushed from the book. Even the central argument that the Seven Years' War is foundational and iconic, like the American Revolution it ultimately caused, could not be fully developed because the narrative became overwhelming. Anderson has discussed these issues elsewhere, and has explained that he deliberately set the "scale" of his narrative, used in a cartographer's sense, to get below the generalizations and to illuminate individuals and events as they might have appeared to participants.⁽⁵⁾ Writing from low altitude, Anderson discovered that one volume could not take him as far as he initially intended. It remains rather hard to believe that such beautiful and measured prose mushroomed up against an author's will. Anderson does not believe that the facts speak for themselves; they speak for him.

Anderson's relentless narrative must go forward, and will undoubtedly address some issues raised by reviewers. The next volume will talk more of ideas for which people were prepared to suffer. Some contributors and readers will be particularly interested in Anderson's treatment of those loyalists who had not become permanently embittered against the British Atlantic empire and were prepared to suffer or fight in its defence. Had their Seven Years' War been different? Were there public remembrances of the recent imperial victories and victors during provincial America's final years, in anniversaries, statues, and place names? Given Anderson's laudable empathy for ordinary people and his apparent bias against men of power, it will also be interesting to read a much less patriotic story of George Washington's America when it was busily re-establishing a "more successful form of empire," a so-called empire of liberty that expelled dissenters, exterminated Amerindians, and extended African slavery.

There is every reason to believe that *The Crucible of War* has become a new version of the American master narrative, despite its deliberate multivalence and its author's disarming admissions. The author and reviewers are aware that he has very effectively confirmed, improved, and reinforced a dominant American provincial perspective on this war, and has successfully reasserted the place of that war in American history. Besides expanding the audience for this subject, this book is already provoking new scholarship that will build on its foundation while challenging several of its claims. Anderson has also raised the standard of narration for all those aspiring to remake the shape and meanings of that global war, or comparable events, in social memory.

The University of Western Ontario

Crucible of Revolution: Fred Anderson's Seven Years' War: Review by John Shy

Francis Parkman, more than a century ago, wrote an enormously popular history of the climactic war between Great Britain and France for dominance in North America. (6) Parkman cast the struggle as a contest between the dynamic force of English Protestantism and the inflexible power of French absolutism and Catholicism, and he personified these qualities in the respective military leaders, James Wolfe and the Marquis de Montcalm. That both men died in the decisive battle for Quebec gave Parkman's history a satisfying dramatic credibility, making Montcalm and Wolfe an enduring classic of American historical writing and anchoring its message firmly in American national mythology.

Fred Anderson has produced a very different version of this war, but his *Crucible of War* deserves the attention, popularity, and durability enjoyed by Parkman's masterpiece. Like Parkman, Anderson writes fluently and forcefully. Like Parkman he has absorbed and digested a wide range of evidence and historical writing. And like Parkman's, Anderson's story bears an important message: that the origins of the American Revolution lie less in the seventeenth-century departure of unhappy people from England for the American colonies and in the standard story of British blunders and American grievance that began with the 1765 Stamp Act, than in the volcanic events of a tremendous war between the world's two greatest maritime and economic empires.

A third historian, Lawrence Henry Gipson, a generation ago anticipated Anderson's message and spent a lifetime producing fifteen volumes that trace the first British Empire from 1748 to its apotheosis in 1759-60, and then on its subsequent stumbling course to the American Declaration of Independence in 1776. But Gipson, immersed in a sea of documents from the Public Record Office and the British Museum, admired the greatness of the old Empire far too much to see clearly and set forth persuasively the vital connection that drives Anderson's narrative -- that out of the "last" American colonial war, 1754-64, came the experience, the memories, the perceptions, the emotions, the conditions, the problems, and many of the people that, a decade later, caused the Empire to erupt in civil war.

The story is familiar: young Washington and Fort Necessity, Braddock, Fort William Henry, the imperious Loudoun, William Pitt, Montcalm at Ticonderoga, Wolfe at Louisbourg and Quebec, Amherst and Pontiac's war; yet Anderson makes it crisp and original, in part with very good writing but also by bringing to each episode a rare grasp of both difficulties and context. For example, from Anderson's judicious quotation from the diaries kept by many New England soldiers, a reader feels the shocking experience for thousands of colonial farm boys of seeing hundreds of British regulars caught in an "abatis" of felled trees (tree limbs sharpened and woven together) and being slaughtered by French musketry and grapeshot at Ticonderoga. A few pages on, he artfully conveys the underlying desperation of this last great victory in the doomed defense of New France when six weeks after defeat at Ticonderoga British and provincial raiders destroyed the French supply base at Fort Frontenac, where Lake Ontario empties into the St. Lawrence. The appalling difficulties of hacking a road straight west across the mountain ridges of Pennsylvania, from Carlisle to the forks of the Ohio, by a force commanded by an iron-willed British general so sick he had to be carried on a litter, has

never been better described, nor has the concurrent effort to persuade the Delaware Indians to give up their support of the French and to make peace with the Anglo-Americans. These are not war stories retold for their own sake, but human experience reconstructed, clearly and persuasively but with all the nuances, personalities, and connections preserved, as well as it can be done on a printed page. Reading the whole story, who can question that the war was indeed a "crucible"?

I can hardly exaggerate my admiration for what Anderson has achieved: a big book that makes a complex, often centrifugal history both coherent and engaging, accessible to anyone who reads and cares. At the same time he has woven through it, a high level of explanatory analysis, mercifully unencumbered by dubious theory or neologistic abstractions. His informing bias, always visible, is in believing that a decade of warfare, requiring in both Britain and America extreme levels of popular and economic mobilization, was transformative, not only of the imperial relationship, but at the deeper psychological level at which people consent to be governed. By 1763 the terms of the Anglo-American Mandate of Heaven had irreversibly changed, and that change had everything to do with what happened in 1775.

It does not diminish admiration to say that Anderson has drawn heavily from the pioneering life's work of Lawrence Gipson, though not from Gipson's sentimental attachment to the old Empire, nor from his pedestrian prose or his wide-ranging yet mind-numbing "coverage" of every corner of the Empire from 1748 to 1776.(7) It is rather the extent and quality of Gipson's research in the archival record that make his fifteen volumes an invaluable resource for much of Anderson's own far more artful and palatable version. Anderson the historian is too good not to see where Gipson must be checked or amplified by his own research in published or manuscript evidence, and the completed *Crucible of War* might well have shaken the giant on whose shoulders Anderson is standing. Gipson admitted to a kind of bewilderment that men on both sides of the Atlantic were such fools as to destroy the glorious, prosperous, and free Empire at its apotheosis, Wolfe dying for all Anglo-America on the Plains of Abraham. Not only has Anderson absorbed the generation of valuable scholarship since Gipson, but he sees the tragic underlay of the Anglo-American triumph, with its fateful four horsemen of high expectation, incorrigible arrogance, domestic confusion, and blinkered misperception riding boldly into the imperial postwar.

Admirable and persuasive as the book is, its perspective and argument raise some important questions. One is raised by the author's confessed dissatisfaction with "historians who robbed their accounts of contingency" (p. xviii). Anderson dwells on the quirks of personality and the vagaries of chance and nature not merely to entertain or even to explain the war's outcome, but because their repercussions often carried far beyond the person or the moment. Examples abound. Montcalm, constricted by the cult of the honorable warrior, and haunted by his memory of the disgraceful 1757 "massacre" after the fall of Fort William Henry, wasted the one asset that might have saved New France -- Indian support. Stumbling British efforts during and after the war to gain control of a vastly enlarged American empire would resonate in later American expansion beyond the Appalachians. Anderson fairly notes whenever larger forces, British seapower for example, or the low priority assigned by Versailles to Canada, largely determined outcomes, but the details of land battles and

local wartime politics matter, because they shaped the memories that would later have such great consequences. How one regards his emphasis on contingency will depend mainly on how one sees the world, but the narrator has told his complex story with unfailing concern for significance.

But narrative is inevitably selective, in current terms "exclusive." Where are the women who ran the New England farms left by thousands of men who joined the annual trek to war? Where are more than 300,000 slaves, whose threat to flee or rebel crippled military mobilization in the southern colonies? Where is Spain and its American empire, visible only when British forces attack Havana and Manila? Is this, then, another "metroliner" account of early America, Boston to Charleston, largely defined by British interests and actions? Yes, although enhanced by a wealth of new scholarship on Indians, it is; but it is accomplished so well that any critic is challenged to do better.

Finally, the book, as well as being a compelling narrative, offers its powerful argument: a decade of imperial warfare was the principal cause of the American Revolution. This argument is woven through the narrative, explaining how a shared military ordeal and triumph damaged the imperial relationship, wounding American sensibilities by war's ambiguous message of partnership and subordination, inflaming British pride and feeding a postwar determination to put obstreperous colonials in their proper place. Doubters disposed to resist the lure of literary art in favour of analytical rigor will insist that American Independence involved much more than imperial breakdown. Where are the revolutionary forces of social, cultural, economic, and demographic change that gave Independence its dynamic quality?

Fred Anderson has gone far toward answering this last question simply by breaking a well-established convention of historical writing about war -- that the story should end when the war ends. Moving his story's end from the 1763 Treaty of Paris forward to 1766, he is able to move the American colonies from their supporting (or obstructive) wartime role to centre stage. Tracing through the last third of his book the economic dislocation, political confusion, and challenges to governance left by war, Anderson brings into focus the extraordinary growth of American population and economy as well as the unique development of a rapidly diversifying yet remarkably cohesive society and culture -- all that would make rebellion against British rule both imaginable and successful.

University of Michigan

North American Baroque: Fred Anderson's Crucible of War: Review by Gregory Evans Dowd

Like a musician using a period instrument, Fred Anderson employs mostly old methods to bring new insights to an old topic: the Seven Years' War in America. The result is majestically Baroque, beautifully and richly composed of men draped in their ambitious dreams. Anderson briefly sets his work off against the materialist and ideological schools that dominated interpretations of the revolution in the late twentieth century, but he never mentions the earlier imperial school, with which he has much in common. To be sure, Anderson's extensive endnotes acknowledge his debt to imperial scholars Lawrence Henry Gipson, but nowhere does he articulate his agreements and differences with

Gipson. Like Gipson, Anderson is deeply convinced of the importance of empire and its transoceanic nature. Unlike Gipson, who celebrated the spread of the English language and British institutions around the globe, Anderson, though brilliant with the language, is less admiring of the institutions and the men who inhabited them. Where there was courage, innovative strategic thinking, or resourcefulness, Anderson openly admires it, but he also leaves us appalled at waste of life, the lack of lofty ideals, and the grim, cutthroat nature not only of imperial war but of imperial politics. One might read the book as a sustained critique of power, and of the woefully flawed men who inevitably abuse it.

But this is not a book with a single argument. On the origins of the Seven Years' War, Anderson is less agnostic than polytheistic. The war stemmed from "such a chain of events" that "would have defied the most exuberant imagining" (pp. 72-73). Sometimes, Anderson sees the war erupting from the convergence of large forces: the "interests of the Iroquois Confederacy, the government of New France, the governor of Virginia, and a group of Anglo-American land speculators" (p. 7). But wary of determinism, he advances no social, economic, or demographic explanations. We do not learn until deep into the war that the British colonists vastly outnumbered the French on the North American continent. If the social force of population is absent, so are ideals. History here turns on the fate of individuals yearning for power, and there are many of them. The land speculators' crass interests (the stuff of the old progressive school) combine with the Crowns' and colonies' strategic concerns (the stuff of the old imperial school) and with the happenstance of personality and faction (as with the students of Sir Lewis Namier) to place individuals at levers of a history that is less a well-oiled engine than a slot machine, the precise workings of which neither could they nor can we pretend to understand.

Even American Indians, to whom Anderson pays admirable and detailed attention, are represented mainly by the individuals Tanaghrisson, Teedyuscung, and Pontiac. Tanaghrisson receives this remarkable credit: "The Seven Years' War could not have begun unless a single desperate Iroquois chief had tried to keep the French from seizing control of the Ohio Valley" (p. xviii). The credit becomes less extraordinary when it is viewed beside what Anderson writes of others; fully a third of the chapter titles contain the names of leading British, French, or Indian men. Anderson occasionally brings us down into the ranks, introducing us to ordinary New England provincials Captain Samuel Jenks, Ensign Rufus Putnam, and Private Gipson Clough (pp. 413-14). Through these soldiers, however, we learn much less of their contest with the French and Indians than we do of the ice forming between Great Britain and New England.

The men described so vigorously appear to have limited loyalties -- mostly to factions and partners, rarely to larger ideals. Thomas Hutchinson, the Marquis de Montcalm, and most ordinary New Englanders generally all come off rather well in this work as men of principle among men on the make, but they are literally swamped by men who reek with ambition. We are left in the dark as to why men pursue so energetically their dreams of power and wealth; they simply do. And if Tanaghrisson was as hungry for power as were young George Washington and Jeffery Amherst, then perhaps the pursuit of power is human nature.

In counterpoint to this emphasis on personality and power, Anderson places a very different theme, which he develops with his elegant explanation for the British victory, the Indian wars that attended it, and the partial collapse of the empire that soon followed. He posits "the decisive influence of cultural factors in shaping the last and greatest of America's colonial wars" (p. 136). Cultural factors appear most boldly in two instances: first, when Anderson resurrects his brilliant arguments from the 1980s about the cultural clash between New England soldiers and British officers; the former, young men of at least prospective means from a relatively egalitarian society deeply imbued with their Puritan forbears' notions of contract, and the latter, ambitious and dutiful men accustomed to social mastery and command. Second, cultural factors appear when he deploys Ian K. Steele's interpretation of the tension between Montcalm, for whom European codes of honour conditioned his sense of self, and his Indian allies, whose expectations from warfare the great French general seemed determined to frustrate (pp. 153-54, 187-201). Assumptions about universal ambition give way to culturally conditioned human desires, clashes which led inexorably to the Cherokee War, to Pontiac's War, and to the American Revolution (pp. 453-56). Perhaps, through examining the cultural context of ambition, one could search for the origins of the Seven Years' War itself, closely interpreting, say, the social and cultural sources of the Virginians' quests for lands and authority, the British officers' and parliamentarians' powerful will to command, or the Ottawas' willingness to endure extreme privation in quest of victory.

As in the older imperial school, Native Americans play here substantial, if far more active, roles. Those who are treated closely emerge, like their European counterparts, as "pols," actively engaged in their quests for power. Anderson dwells on the Six Nations Iroquois League, and, to a lesser degree, their semisubordinates, the Delawares. He sees the League councillors as busily engaged in "complementary, activist policies" (pp. 15-16) actuated by the "central principle" of playing France against England (p. 16), an interpretation that underestimates League factionalism. It is equally likely that the League and its arrangements with its neighbours were collapsing. Anderson well understands that Delawares, Shawnees, and other semi-dependents broke free of the League, but they were not its most serious problem. Sizeable contingents of Six Nations peoples living in villages in the Ohio country, the Niagara region, and the St. Lawrence acted independently of the League, which was more than fraying at the edges. The desire of League leaders to regain control over the Ohioan peoples provides Anderson with an explanation for Tanaghrisson's service in the company of George Washington in 1754, but if that was strong, it is difficult to understand why the League -- save for a faction of the Mohawks who had little to do with the Ohioans -- essentially failed to support the British until 1759.

If League influence is overrated, the role of Ottawas, Ojibwas, and other Indians of the pays d'en haut remains under-examined. Great Lakes Indians were enormously active in the war; they almost certainly participated in greater numbers and in far more actions than did the Six Nations. Indeed in some readings of the Seven Years' War, they led the first action -- not at Jumonville's Glen, but at the Miami town and British trading posts at Pickawillany attacked by Charles-Michel Mouet de Langlade (a man both Ottawa and French), 210 Great Lakes Indians, and a mere 30 French soldiers in 1752 (pp. 28-29). Great Lakes-area Ottawas and Ojibwas who allied with France also lived in an alliance that

was fraying at the edges, and they joined France's expansion into the Ohio Country to combat the factionalism that threatened to destroy a system that had benefitted them. When the French invaded the Ohio Country, Great Lakes Indians usually accompanied them. When, for example, Captain Louis Coulon de Villiers sallied out from Fort Duquesne to fight George Washington at Fort Necessity, he had in his company mission Indians from the reserves on the St. Lawrence River as well as Algonkians, Mississaugas, Nipissings, Ottawas, and others from the Great Lakes. Anderson lists Washington's enemies at Fort Necessity as Shawnees, Delawares, and Mingos, relying on the indirect and anonymous report of a resident of (of all places) Paxton, Pennsylvania. French sources do mention Ohioan Senecas, but the company consisted mainly of Indians long allied with France. Why these people were camping about Fort Duquesne in 1754 -- before they knew a war would present opportunities for booty -- requires some attention. It may be, as Anderson suggests, that over the next five years booty, brandy, trophies, and potential ransom lured Great Lakes peoples and the southerly Cherokees into the great fray (pp. 99, 103, 187, 458) while strategic considerations animated Iroquois, but we might also credit (or discredit) Indians of the lakes, and their Cherokee enemies, with larger ambitions.

There are, though, many insights for the Indian historian. A wonderful, brief chapter describes Fort Pitt as both a symbol and a betrayal. A terrific chapter on the Cherokee War makes a fine case for the influence of that war on the formation of Jeffery Amherst's disastrous Indian policy. Much as the Seven Years' War begat the Revolution, it begat sooner and in rapid succession the Cherokee War and Pontiac's War (which also gets careful treatment). Interestingly, demographic forces are credited with precipitating Pontiac's War, as Anderson attends to the "dynamism of a farming population" (p. 526). No doubt the war was about land in the Susquehanna and the Ohio valleys, but it could not have been largely about land in Detroit, where, far from the colonies, it began.

Indians, then, get much consideration. Women, on the other hand, receive a paragraph (p. 684), and slaves, who surface rarely, are left alone. We can only guess how the war in the Caribbean, which "starved" planters of "manufactures and foodstuffs" (p. 490) affected the slaves' already poor lives. If the issues of gender, race, and class that have so animated recent historians are largely (save for the work on Indians) absent, so is a sustained discussion of great constitutional issues or vigorous, animating ideologies; instead, while the issues at stake in the Stamp Act and its aftermath do lace through the narrative, they are covered in the dense foliage of personalities, "local competition, tensions, and anxieties" (p. 729).

Those with a taste for vaulting complexity, for the elaboration of patterns, for deep skepticism about human nature, and for the rejection of social and ideological explanations of change will love this book. Whatever one's tastes, Anderson's mastery of detail, narrative, and breadth of action invite both deep admiration and serious attention.

University of Notre Dame

A Canadian Perspective on Anderson's *Crucible of War*: Review by Jay Cassel

While the Seven Years' War may be an obscure event for most Americans (p. xv), it has greater prominence in the minds of Canadians, making its way into political platforms (the Parti Quebecois) and prime-ministerial speeches. I admired *A People's Army*, so I looked forward to reading Fred Anderson's new book. Relying on much of the best current and past scholarship, Anderson does many things well. He has produced a comfortable read with flowing prose and bite-sized chapters.

It does not take long to discover that Anderson is much better at dealing with American history than that of New France.⁽⁸⁾ In part this reflects the state of Canadian scholarship. Little has been done on the war in over a generation -- since the days of Fregault (major publications: 1948-55) Stacey (1959) and Stanley (1968). Subsequent surveys generally repeat their themes.⁽⁹⁾ The notable exception is Ian Steele, working his way north from American history. The mid-eighteenth century is almost a dead field in Canada. Why? From my observation, most French Canadians remain satisfied with Fregault's analysis, altering it only in detail. Fregault argued that Canada was beset by rapacious Anglo-American imperialism, and the brave, skilful and resourceful Canadians were let down by a decadent France, Bigot's appallingly corrupt entourage, and incompetent regular officers who looked down on colonials. (Given its unflattering portrait of Americans, I am not surprised that Fregault's impressively researched but polemical history is one of the few that does not appear in Anderson's footnotes.) English Canada is embarrassed by the Seven Years' War, especially when the PQ are high in the polls. "The War of the Conquest," as it is called in Quebec, the "Military Regime" and the era of the Royal Proclamation are the Canadian equivalent of the American Civil War and Reconstruction -- terrible, polarizing events.

Anderson tells us that he gave a lot of thought to his narrative and its structure (pp. xxii, 834); therefore so should we. A narrator controls the point of view, sequence of events, length, detail, and tone. In this way he guides attention, influences emotions, and shapes conclusions. Anderson wanted to satisfy general readers and professional historians (p. xv), and satisfaction is a prominent feature of American reviews. Anderson wanted to make a case for contingency, relocating both idealist and materialist analyses in the explanatory scheme (pp. xxii-xxiii). For these reasons he has foregrounded some things and set others deep in the background.

The story of Jumonville serves as prologue. It is a good choice; all three parties are present: Jumonville represents the invading French, Tanaghrisson the distressed Indians and George Washington the English coming to their aid. Tanaghrisson plants his hatchet in the skull of the Frenchman, "pulled out a handful of viscous tissue, and washed his hands in Jumonville's brain" (p. 6). Washington is stunned. So are most of Anderson's readers. Who are these characters? The gravitational pull of one greatly exceeds the others' and far more is written about him in the Prologue. In the book's Epilogue, "Mount Vernon," only one character is left standing. George. This is not a multi-party history told from various perspectives like Jill Lepore's *Name of War*⁽¹⁰⁾ or Ian Steele's *Warpaths*.⁽¹¹⁾ This is a white American narrative.

One element in the history of fighting between 1754 and 1757 is rendered at greater length and more memorably than any other: the activity of Indian warriors. Note the language: "Indian war parties killed... settlers" and "frontier inhabitants" had to "abandon their homesteads" (p. 108). This sways emotions more than a recollection of the land grab back in Chapter 2. What do we remember from the short chapter on the siege of Fort Oswego? The slaughter in the hospital. Until page 346, Montcalm's thoughts on war are represented largely in terms of his revulsion for Indian warfare. This narrative builds to a climax at Fort William Henry where "dozens of warriors began to tomahawk the most exposed groups" (p. 197) conjuring images of many English-speaking Jumonvilles. American hostility has become understandable.

Why do these men fight? Anderson tells us that "Indians fought to gain prisoners, trophies and booty" (p. 151). This serves to emphasize the predatory nature of Indians on the battlefield. There is little on Indian war aims. Consider the Abenaki. For decades Massachusetts had been taking their land. Not surprisingly the Abenaki play a prominent part at William Henry. This we are not told. Why do other Indians fight? Which tribes are allied to the French and why? None of this is discussed (aside from the fact that trade goods are important). Why do the Americans fight? Because they were attacked. This is reinforced by much discussion of imperial politics. But what are the motives of the Americans and the English? What are the motives of the Canadians and the French? Anderson's effort to convey the horrifying experience of Americans under attack overwhelms what limited information we are given about other considerations. Anderson does record Wolfe's attempt at extenuation: "We cut them to pieces whenever we found them, in return for a thousand acts of cruelty and barbarity" (p. 254). The reader may well sympathize with the general, especially when Anderson puts in a reminder about William Henry but says nothing about why British soldiers at Louisbourg are getting killed by Micmacs and Abenakis... and Acadians.

The English fought because they wanted someone else's property. We are briefly told about the Walking Purchase, the Treaty of Lancaster, and the Ohio Company in Chapter 2. At an obscure point, on page 106, we learn that Washington was a land-speculator with shares in the company. But in the Introduction we were told "The Seven Years' War could not have begun unless a single desperate Iroquois chief had tried to keep the French from seizing control of the Ohio Valley" (p. xviii), a point reinforced in the Prologue. The Iroquois had grabbed other people's land (including the Ohio valley). So had the French. No one here is a saint. One of the biggest land grabs took place in Nova Scotia. There the Acadian people were not just dispossessed, they were deported. Anderson gets past that in three paragraphs (pp. 113-14). Fregault made it the middle of his five-part history, the fulcrum of his narrative. The English were also interested in profits from fur, fishing, and cargo-carrying. Before the declaration of war they seized over 300 French merchant ships. This was the biggest act of piracy in the eighteenth century. Anderson only mentions two warships. His "closely focused narrative" (p. xxii) downplays the Anglo-American quest for material gain.

What was in their minds? Anderson will not discuss ideology. We get tiny references to the hatred of papists (pp. xviii, 24, 199). Attention focuses on high policy and strategy, on politicians and commanding officers. This is very different from the wonderful entourage of everyday men in A

People's Army. By not analysing ideas, as Lepore did in *The Name of War*, Anderson reduces the chance that readers will reflect on their own responses.

In Chapter 46 Anderson tells us that "Great Britain triumphed in North America for two related reasons" (p. 453). "The military factor... centred on supplies." Cue the Navy. Anderson pushes so many important strategic and tactical matters into the background that I cannot believe he really means this at face value.⁽¹²⁾ (Indeed, other matters were briefly noted in Chapter 44.) But then he says "If Occam's razor could shave historians' arguments [the supply] factor might fully account for the fall of Canada" (p. 454). Then why has so little been said about logistics (across France and New France, Britain and the Thirteen Colonies)? Perhaps because Anderson thinks that "Only an understanding of the cultural interactions... can explain Anglo-American victory in such a way as to make sense of [later] problems" (p. 454). But if culture is so important, why has its treatment been so limited and scattered through the first 400 pages?

Anderson produces a mirage of increasing English co-operation and French disintegration during the first half of his time-frame, then makes a case for the process running in reverse among the English during the second half. He talks about "openhanded policies that had produced such remarkable cooperation between [English] colonists, the empire and the Indians" (p. 455). By his own account this lasted a bare nine months between the Treaty of Easton (October 1758) and the construction of Fort Pitt, which led Indians to protest about "dishonest treatment" (pp. 327-29). It calls to mind the land deals back in Chapter Two. On the French side, he sees trade goods (a supply problem) and Montcalm's attitude to the Indians and the colonists as key. We are told that French alliances with the nations (which? all?) of the pays d'en haut failed after William Henry, and mission Indians grew reluctant (pp. 199, 454). Actually, the numbers in 1759 were close to those in 1757, despite deaths resulting from disease and war.⁽¹³⁾ Forbes could not attract Indians. Amherst loathed them. So did Wolfe. The attitudes of some Indians were affected by agreements not to kill each other in battles between Europeans, a calculation of who might win, a desire to avoid English retribution, and a hope that the promises at Easton were genuine. According to Anderson "in 1760 the Chevalier de Levis and his regulars stood alone" (p. 454). No. At the Battle of Ste Foy Canadians made up half the army (p. 392). The Franco-Canadian army routed Murray's army (the same men Wolfe and Stacey considered clearly superior). They nearly enveloped it, which would have led to immediate capitulation of the English at Quebec.

Having entered British North America as the 15th colony, Canada disappears from view in the middle of the book, surfacing for a brief mention on two occasions (pp. 523, 566, 568). Murray's administration is reviewed in a paragraph (pp. 730-31) and dismissed as the work of a "headstrong governor" who merchants alleged had a "partiality for the Canadians" (no opinion from our author). Evidently cultural interactions between the English and French, Protestants and Catholics, are no longer important. Arrangements begun in the 1760s shaped the social, cultural and economic development of Canada, leading to a constitution enshrined in the British North America Act. There is one thing on which French and English Canada will agree: omitting developments in this period from a book on "the Fate of Empire in British North America" is not satisfying.

London, Ontario

The French and Indian War Without the French: Fred Anderson's Crucible of War: Review by Jonathan R. Dull

Fred Anderson set himself a difficult standard to match with his superb first book, *A People's Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years' War*.⁽¹⁴⁾ This carefully-researched and well-written study of the impact of the war of 1755-62 on Massachusetts society and its attitudes toward Great Britain has been followed by similar books on Connecticut by Harold Selesky⁽¹⁵⁾ and on Virginia by James Titus.⁽¹⁶⁾ Not surprisingly, Anderson's general history of the Seven Years' War has been eagerly awaited. The last comparable study, L.H. Gipson's *The Great War for the Empire* has not worn well,⁽¹⁷⁾ particularly because of Gipson's patronizing attitude toward Indians and blacks and because of his pro-British bias. Anderson's *Crucible of War* is well-intentioned, fair-minded, and free from jargon, intellectual arrogance, and attacks on other historians. On balance, however, it is somewhat disappointing, excellent in the areas Anderson knows best, but deficient on a number of topics he has not researched adequately.

Some 200 of Anderson's approximately 700 pages of text are devoted to American social and political history. (These are intermingled with other topics, but I separate them for purposes of analysis.) His chief concerns are those he studied in his first book, but expanded geographically and chronologically. His argument that the war created stresses between Britain and her American colonies is basically sound, although too much can be read into those stresses (as has been argued by an article which Anderson does not cite by John M. Murrin.)⁽¹⁸⁾ This topic, however, is one that has been studied frequently, by Anderson himself as well as by Alan Rogers, Jack P. Greene, John Shy, and others.⁽¹⁹⁾ Moreover, his selection of 1766 as an end point for his book seems rather artificial. Nevertheless, Anderson is to be congratulated for the skill with which he has presented his argument and the depth of his research. Most of his 86 pages of endnotes deal with American history and he has mastered a wide range of published sources.

Roughly 100 pages of text deal with the effects on native peoples of the hostilities of 1754-60, the Cherokee War of 1760-61, and the general uprising of 1763-64 commonly called Pontiac's rebellion. These pages are an intelligent and sensitive synthesis of monographs by a number of historians, including such brilliant scholars as Richard White and Michael N. McConnell.⁽²⁰⁾ Again, his research is wide ranging and his writing clear and perceptive, even if most of what he says is not particularly original. His work, moreover, can be cursory; he devotes only one paragraph, for example, to the Paxton Boys affair.

He is much less sure-footed, however, when he discusses the British inner cabinet and its workings, particularly military strategy and post-war colonial policy. Incidentally, his account is somewhat confused about the relationship of the privy council, the cabinet, and the inner or secret cabinet, the last of which was the real locus of power. Although he has done considerable reading in the field, there are some important authors he does not cite, such as J.C.D. Clark and Karl W. Schweizer, who

have not only written important monographs but have also edited the papers of such figures as Earl Waldegrave and the Duke of Devonshire. (21) Anderson tends, however, to lean heavily on secondary sources; for example, he cites only once Sir John Fortescue's edition of King George III's correspondence. (22) Consequently, as a work of British history *Crucible of War* is rather conventional.

Reflecting Anderson's announced intention of reaching a popular audience, one of the largest portions of his book, about 200 pages, is a military history of the war against the French and their Indian allies in North America. Anderson's writing is lively and occasionally creative, such as his account of Washington's attack on the Jumonville party, which began the war. His history is compromised, however, by an excessive reliance on published English-language primary and secondary sources. Of his approximately 2,500 citations only about half a dozen are in French and none are in German or Spanish. He never cites the major published documentary collection for French and Canadian military operations edited by Abbe Henri-Raymond Casgrain. (23) Although he is relatively free from anti-French prejudice, he does not present a balanced account of the war, failing for example to give adequate credit to the strategic genius of Governor General Vaudreuil. Worse still, the book has no discussion of the French government's strategic planning. King Louis XV is mentioned only in passing, and of France's four wartime foreign ministers, four war ministers, and five naval ministers (some, like War Minister Belle-Isle and Naval Minister Machault, of outstanding quality) he pays attention only to the Duke de Choiseul. (He does not cite, however, Choiseul's memoirs or his published correspondence with either his predecessor Bernis or his friend Danish Foreign Minister Bernstorff.) (24) Even on purely American military topics, such as the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, Anderson's conclusions do not inspire confidence. His explanations on page 359 for the recklessness of Montcalm (that he was "rattled... out of his wits") and Wolfe (that he had a death wish) are at best simplistic and do not take account of Montcalm's distrust of the steadiness of Canadians or Wolfe's habitual reliance on boldness to overcome all obstacles.

Choiseul more than once claimed that France was involved in two wars, one of her own in North America and one in Europe, in which she was only an auxiliary of Austria. This was merely a ploy to keep Austria from interfering with his negotiations with Britain. The war in Europe from 1756 to 1763 was intimately connected with the war in America and had a huge impact on the future of America. Particularly important was the war in Germany. By forcing the British to spend huge sums on defending their king's Electorate of Hanover, Louis and Choiseul sapped the English electorate's patience for a seemingly endless war and thereby saved France's access to the Newfoundland fishery. This in turn was indispensable for the rebirth of the French Navy, a prerequisite for France's involvement in the War of American Independence. The key French victory in Germany was the Battle of Kloster Kamp (16 October 1760); the astute Spanish Foreign Minister Ricardo Wall believed that had the French been defeated they would have had to evacuate all their forces from Germany. Although Anderson devotes only about twenty pages to the war outside America, he mentions Kloster Kamp twice -- on page 481 he calls the battle indecisive and on page 416 he calls it a British victory.

There are similar problems with naval history to which he devotes about fifteen pages, about half of them to the spectacular battle of Quiberon Bay. On page 381 he writes of the French putting to sea

with full crews; in fact, the crews consisted largely of untrained landsmen. Two pages later he writes that after the battle twelve ships escaped into the River Vilaine but only three ever made it out. Actually, seven ships of the line escaped into the Vilaine and all but one eventually returned to Brest. This story is told in Maurice Linyer de La Barbee's excellent biography of the officer who engineered their escape, the Chevalier de Ternay.(25) Anderson should have been familiar with it, because Ternay also commanded the French squadron which captured Newfoundland in 1762 (which Anderson discusses on page 498).

About twenty pages of *Crucible of War* deal with the alliances of European princes and the making of peace. The only non-British monarch to whom Anderson devotes much attention is Frederick the Great of Prussia, yet Anderson does not cite the monumental *Politische Correspondenz Friedrich's des Grossen*.(26) One of his few excursions into diplomatic history is his hint on page 802 that the Franco-Spanish Family Compact was the work of Queen Maria Amelia of Spain, who hated Frederick. She actually was a fierce opponent of closer ties with France, in large part out of anger at King Louis XV for spoiling the projected marriage of her daughter to Empress Maria Theresa's eldest son. Only after her death in October 1760, did serious negotiations begin. Anderson would have benefited from using the masterpiece of one of France's greatest military and diplomatic historians, Richard Waddington's incomparable *La Guerre de Sept Ans: Histoire diplomatique et militaire*.(27)

Anderson's attempt to discuss the war as a whole is admirable, but he has undermined his efforts by concentrating too exclusively on North America and by relying almost exclusively on English-language sources. Unfortunately he thereby provides ammunition to those who accuse American historians of provincialism. It should be said, however, that when discussing British-American colonists, his major interest, he does quite well. He is an industrious and talented scholar, an eloquent and colourful writer, and a spokesperson for progressive and humane values. I look forward to his future work.

New Haven, Connecticut

Fred Anderson's Seven Years' War in imperial perspective: Review by P.J. Marshall

Contributors to this forum have had their territory allocated to them, but it would be utterly churlish not to stray out of it and begin with a few general comments on this splendid book. Credits must begin with the publisher. Alfred A. Knopf are making available at airport bookstalls at a most reasonable price a book with standards of production which the British university presses cannot now match even for specialised scholarly monographs or editions of texts at the astronomical prices that they currently charge. Its typeface and paper are of sumptuous quality; it has robust binding and is embellished by beautiful illustrations and excellent maps finely reproduced.

Anderson's literary skills mean that the content matches his publisher's capacity to produce what is a most attractive object, likely to appeal to a wide audience who will want to read as well as to own the book. He has the laudable aim of trying to be "accessible to general readers" and to be understood by

those "without specialized prior knowledge" (p. xv). He writes with much panache but with exemplary clarity and a vigour that carries the reader easily and agreeably through a long book. Both specialists and non-specialists will enjoy the sharp delineation of personalities, such as an uncharacteristically acerbic one of Wolfe, who at Quebec "stood a fair chance of sacrificing twelve superb battalions to no larger purpose than gratifying his desire for a heroic death" (p. 359), and the narratives of the great setpieces of the war in North America, Washington at Fort Necessity, Braddock on the Monongahela, Amherst at Louisbourg, as well as Wolfe at Quebec.

If the book is a fine example of military history in its traditional form, the narrative of campaigns and of the fortunes of war, it is also military history with all its modern sophistication, which treats war as an expression of the capacities and values of whole societies, and it is much more than military history even at its most ambitious. As its subtitle proclaims, it is an account of the "fate of empire in British North America" and of the emergence of the United States of America. To encompass this great theme, Anderson extends his coverage beyond the formal end of the war to the repeal of the Stamp Act and the passing of the Declaratory Act in 1766. He believes that events after the end of the Seven Years' War, which are conventionally seen as marking the first stages of the revolution, in fact saw the continuation of a great debate about the colonies' role in the empire that had begun with the war.

The theme of war and its role in the failure of empire is set out at the very beginning of the book and sustained throughout. "Without the Seven Years' War, American independence would surely have been long delayed, and achieved (if at all) without a war of national liberation" (p. xvi). The essence of the argument is that the war gave rise to fundamentally different interpretations of the nature of the British empire on both sides of the Atlantic. On the American side the war was seen as "a providential victory, secured by free men in a glorious cause -- that shaped the understanding of the colonists, lifted their expectations of imperial partnership, and embittered their reactions to the seemingly high-handed, intrusive policies that Grenville, Halifax and their colleagues sought to impose" after the war (p. 587). These policies were directly attributable to the British interpretation of the experience of the war. Its lessons for them were that "there was no relying on Americans" (p. 585). Britain had been forced to depend during the war on the willingness of Americans to contribute men and money of their own volition. It was widely believed that they had done so inadequately. The empire must now be made to work through the capacity of a sovereign British authority to command compliance rather than again risking the uncertainties of voluntary co-operation. Hence British troops were to be kept in America in peacetime and were to be paid for by colonial contributions levied by parliament. The right of parliament to tax Americans became the issue which symbolised the claim of Britain to exercise a sovereign authority over its colonies. On this issue the empire broke apart.

Anderson's argument about how the war was interpreted in British political circles is the concern of this contribution to the forum. It must be said straightaway that a close connection between British understandings of the war and the post-war policies is hard to contest. Anderson has what most historians would surely regard as a strong case. Yet the issue is a more complex one than it perhaps seems. Some of the complexities were long ago pointed out by John Murrin in an article of which

Anderson is well aware.(28) The lessons of the war were not unambiguous. The American view of it as the triumph of an Anglo-American alliance in which colonies like Massachusetts had born a crippling burden in relation to their size and resources was at least as plausible, especially for the later years of the war, as the British version of victories won by British regulars and sailors, sustained by the British taxpayer with at best half-hearted colonial support.

Nor had all British political figures believed that the war could only be waged with the subordination of the colonies. At the outbreak of the fighting in North America it was widely expected that the colonies should be able to bear the brunt of it. The Duke of Newcastle was wary about the commitment of royal troops. "Regulars must not be puffed up," he wrote in 1755, "Indians must be engag'd if possible and Americans must do our business."(29) Pitt blamed Lord Loudoun for "not treating the provincial troops as well as they deserved."(30) Anderson describes Pitt's policy as being to deal with the colonies "like allies, offering subsidies to encourage their assemblies to aid in the conquest of New France" (p. 214). This was the policy effectively pursued after 1758.

Speculation about what might have happened had the Pitt-Newcastle coalition survived the ending of the war depends on making utterly improbable assumptions, such as the virtual immortality of George II. To ask what these great men might have done had they been in office when new policies had to be devised for the colonies is not therefore to pose a counterfactual question of any validity. It is not even one that can be answered with any confidence, especially for Pitt. Pitt seems to have wanted more regulars in America rather than a return to relying on provincials in peacetime. Nevertheless, the indications, such as they are, are surely that they would not have pushed policies with the rigour that Grenville did. This might not have made any difference, but it does perhaps suggest that understandings of the lessons of the Seven Years' War on the British side were not monolithic. Theoretically at least, there were alternatives to what was actually done. Little as the gyrations of British politics in the early 1760s had to do with colonial issues, how the chips actually fell may have mattered more than is commonly supposed.

The importance of the supposed lessons of the war for those who did make policy from 1763-65 can hardly be doubted, but the wider contest in which such men thought about government still merits exploration. The "underlying issue" for Grenville, Anderson writes, "was always control: sovereignty: dominion" (p. 580). Such beliefs surely had deeper roots than the experience of war in North America. For all its transcendent merits, Anderson's book is still a little touched with the parochialism of American colonial history, even when it calls itself "Atlantic history." British ministers in the age of the Seven Years' War were wrestling with old problems of how to manage the Scottish Highlands and Ireland and were embarking on huge new ones in India. Even in 1761 Pitt was said to be "thoroughly convinced of the infinite consequence of the trade of the East India Company to the nation" and to "make no scruple of giving it the preference to our concerns in America."(31) "Control: Sovereignty: Dominion" were being invoked all over the world. In part these preoccupations arose from an acute sense of national danger, but they also reflected the increasingly authoritarian assumptions of a new generation of political leaders. These assumptions are attracting the attention of younger scholars like David Armitage and Eliga Gould.(32) Their work is creating a new intellectual history of the British

empire. That history cannot be assumed to be solely the history of Britain's experiences with the thirteen colonies.

King's College, London

NOTES

(1) F. Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British, North America, 1754-1766* (New York, Knopf, 2000), 862 pp., \$40 U.S.

(2) *Towards Lexington: The British Army and the Coming of the American Revolution* (Princeton, 1965); *A People Numerous and Armed* (New York, 1978).

(3) *A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815* (Baltimore, 1992).

(4) Including *The Impeachment of Warren Hastings* (Oxford, 1965); *The British Discovery of Hindustan in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1970); *East India Fortunes: The British in Bengal in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 1976); with G. Williams, *The Great Map of Mankind: British Perceptions of the World in the Age of Enlightenment* (London, 1982). Marshall is also editor of *The New Cambridge History of India*, 11.2 *Bengal: The British Bridgehead, Eastern India, 1740-1828* (Cambridge, 1987) and *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, Vol. II, *The Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 1998).

(5) See F. Anderson and A.R.L. Cayton, "The Problem of Fragmentation and the Prospects for Synthesis in Early American Social History," *William & Mary Quarterly*, 3rd series, 50 (1993), 299-310 and his response in the on-line forum at www.common_place.org.

(6) See F. Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*. In *France and England in North America*, part 7, vol. 1 and in *Francis Parkman's Works*, vol. 8 (Boston 1897).

(7) See, for example, L. Gipson, *The British Empire before the American Revolution* (Indiana, 1936-70), 7 vols.; *The Coming of the Revolution 1763-1775* (New York, 1954), 287 pp.

(8) I must forego a detailing of factual errors, for example, several regarding Bigot and the Canadian economy (pp. 237-38).

(9) For example, Eccles in the *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, 3, 458-68, and 4, 662-74 and his critique of the Battle of the Plains in *Essays on New France* (Toronto 1987), pp. 125-33.

(10) J. Lepore, *The Name of War: King Phillip's War and the Origins of American Identity* (New York, 1998), 384 pp.

(11) I. Steele, *Warpaths: Invasions of North America* (Oxford, 1994), 304 pp.

(12) For example, a eurocentric French strategy; a Canadian strategy of expansive defence; failure to maintain the Lake Ontario fleet in operational state and strengthen Fort Frontenac, both entirely feasible with their resources; and tactical blunders by St Luc's men at Oswego (not mentioned by Anderson) and by Lignery which combined to cost the French Fort Niagara. Victory on the Plains was due to many factors and supply was not pre-eminent.

(13) D.P. Macleod, "Microbes and Muskets: Smallpox and the Participation of the Amerindian Allies of New France in the Seven Years' War," *Ethnohistory*, 39 (1992), 42-64.

(14) F. Anderson, *A People's Army...* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1984), 274 pp.

(15) H. Selesky, *War and Society in Colonial Connecticut* (New Haven, Connecticut, 1990), 278 pp.

(16) J. Titus, *The Old Dominion at War: Society, Politics and Warfare in Late Colonial Virginia* (Columbia, South Carolina, 1991), 213 pp.

(17) Volumes 6 to 8 (New York, 1946-54) of his 15 vol., *The British Empire before the American Revolution*.

(18) J.W. Murrin, "The French and Indian War, the American Revolution, and the Counterfactual Hypothesis: Reflections on Lawrence Henry Gipson and John Shy," *Reviews in American History*, 1 (1973), 307-18.

(19) See, for example, A. Rogers, *Empire and Liberty: American Resistance to British Authority, 1755-1763* (Berkeley, 1974), 205 pp.; J.P. Greene, "The Seven Years' War and the American Revolution: The Causal Relationship Reconsidered," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 8 (1979-80), 85-105; J. Shy, *Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution* (Princeton, 1965), 463 pp.

(20) R. White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge, 1991), 544 pp.; M.N. McConnell, *A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724-1774* (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1992), 372 pp.

(21) See J.C.D. Clark, *The Dynamics of Change: The Crisis of the 1750s and English Party Systems* (Cambridge, 1982), 615 pp.; J.C.D. Clark (ed.), *The Memoirs and Speeches of James, 2[Symbol Not Transcribed] Earl Waldegrave, 1742-1763* (Cambridge, 1988), 340 pp.; and K.W. Schweizer, *Frederick the Great, William Pitt, and Lord Bute: The Anglo-Prussian Alliance, 1756-1763* (New York,

1991), 358 pp.; P.D. Brown and K.W. Schweizer (eds.), *Memoranda on State of Affairs, 1759-1762: The Devonshire Diary: William Cavendish, fourth Duke of Devonshire* (London, 1982), 199 pp.

(22) Sir John Fortescue (ed.), *The Correspondence of King George the Third from 1760 to December 1783: Printed from the Original Papers in the Royal Archives at Windsor Castle* (London, 1927-28), 6 vols.

(23) Abbe H-R. Casgrain (ed.), *Collection des manuscrits du marechal de Levis* (Montreal and Quebec, 1889-95), 12 vols.

(24) J.-P. Guicciardi and Philippe Bonnet (eds.), *Memoires du due de Choiseul...* (Paris, 1982), 335 pp.; F. Masson, ed., *Memoires et lettres de Francois-Joachim de Pierre, Cardinal de Beonis* (1715-1758) (Paris, 1778) 2 vols., P.A.F.S. Vedel (ed.), *Correspondence entre le Comte Johan Hartuig Ernst Bernstorff et le duc de Choiseul, 1758-1766* (Copenhagen, 1871), 256 pp.

(25) M. Linyer de La Barbee, *Le Chevalier de Ternay* (Grenoble, 1972 edn), 2 vols.

(26) The collection was published in Berlin, 1879-1939 and is 47 volumes in length.

(27) This five-volume work was published in Paris, 1899-1914.

(28) "The French and Indian War, the American Revolution and the Counterfactual Hypothesis: Reflections on Lawrence Henry Gipson and John Shy," *Reviews in American History*, 1 (1973), 307-19, cited by Anderson, p. 814.

(29) To Holderness, 26 August 1755, British Library, Add MS 32858, fo. 293.

(30) J. Calcraft to Loudoun, 29 December 1757, Huntington Library MS, LO 5140.

(31) J. Malcolm, *The Life of Robert Lord Clive*, 3 vols. (London, 1836), II, 203.

(32) See, for example, D. Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge, 2000), series: *Ideas in Context*, no. 59; and E. Gould, *The Persistence of Empire: British Political Culture in the Age of the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 2000), 288 pp.

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